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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. AND
DETERMINATIVE LAWS OR STATUTES
Plaintiff does not dispute the allegations contained in the Jurisdictional
Statement, Statement of the Issues, or Statement of Determinative Laws or Statutes as
set forth in Defendant's Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff disputes the characterizations contained in Defendant's Statement of the
Case under the heading of the "Nature of the Case" as containing irrelevant and
immaterial allegations. The Statement of the Case, to be accurate, should be as follows:
(1)

The Defendant executed a promissory note dated December 20,

1986 in favor of Plaintiff.
(2)

The note was a standard form promissory note which was clear and

unambiguous as to the parties and its terms.
(3)

Defendant did not pay the note according to its terms.

(4)

The promissory note did not reference a "diesel tractor truck", or

other security collateral or happening of a future event or a contingency.
Defendant alleged that the sale of the truck was the basis for the promissory
note.
(5)

The Plaintiff filed an action to collect amounts owing under the

promissory note.

1

RELEVANT FACTS
Plaintiff disputes the following referenced facts contained in Defendant's Brief
under the heading "Relevant Facts" (page 3), to wit: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5. These
statements are irrelevant, unnecessary, and concern a matter not at issue in the present
lawsuit and/or are barred by the Parole Evidence Rule.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It was proper as a matter of law for the Trial Court to render summary judgment
under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Assuming, for argument purposes only, that there were representations by the
Plaintiff to the Defendant, the decision of the Trial Court granting Plaintiff summary
judgment was proper as a matter of law.
The Defendant has waived or is estopped from asserting fraud as an affirmative
defense.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT WAS PROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
RENDER SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER THE
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
The promissory note, which is the subject of Plaintiffs Complaint, a copy of which
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", is a standard form promissory note obUgating the
Defendant to pay to Plaintiff a sum certain upon the terms stated in the note. The
promissory note is indisputably clear and unambiguous on its face, and this was a finding
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of fact made by the Trial Court (Determination of Fact entered by the Trial Court, page
3, para. 8, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B") and an issue not in dispute
by the parties on appeal. The note does not contain a reference to the sale of a truck
or contain any representation regarding the alleged "road worthiness" of the truck. In
fact, the promissory note makes no reference to any collateral, security, representation,
contingency, or future events as a condition of payment.
The Parole Evidence Rule provides that if the contract is in writing and the
language is not ambiguous, the intention of the party must be determined from the
words of the agreement. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991); Atlas
Corp. v. Clovis Nafl Bank, 737 P.2d 225,229 (Utah 1987); Oberhanslvv.Earle, 572 P.2d
1384, 1386 (Utah 1977).
A court may only consider extrinsic evidence after careful consideration of the
contract language to determine if it is ambiguous or uncertain. Winegar, Supra.;
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292,1983 (Utah 1983).
A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation because of "uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial
deficiencies". Winegar, Supra.: Mann v. Wetter, 785 P.2d 1064,1067 (Ore.App. 1990).
Whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law. See Faulkner, Supra, at
1293.
In this case, the promissory note between the parties is clear and ambiguous.
Accordingly, it was proper for the Court to not allow parole evidence and render
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summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant for the balance of the
promissory note.
POINT II
FOR ARGUMENT ONLY, THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WAS PROPER AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A. Defendant's argument that the parole evidence should be allowed is
without merit.
Summary judgment was granted by the Trial Court based upon afindingthat the
promissory note was in fact clear and unambiguous on its face and that it "did not refer
to any collateral or security or the happening of any future event11. (Exh. "B", para. 8).
Defendant argues that the case of Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah
1985) is controlling and that pursuant to the ruling of Union Bank it was improper for
the Trial Court to have rendered summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.
In Union Bank, the Appellant (Swenson) executed a promissory note in favor of
Appellee (Union Bank). The Appellant, Ronald Swenson, signed the note as president
of State Lumber, Inc. and Mr. and Mrs. Swenson also executed the note "individually
and personally". Subsequently, there was a default on the note and Union Bank sued
State Lumber and the Swensons personally to recover on the promissory note. Union
Bank moved for summary judgment against the Swensons. The Swensons, in their
amended answer, set forth the affirmative defense that they had not intended to
personally guarantee the subject promissory note. The Swensons allege that Union Bank
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representatives had assured them that their signatures was for appearances only and that
there would be no effort to collect them personally. (Union at 664).
In Union Bank, the Swensons filed affidavits which alleged that the bank
representative indicated that the purpose for the instrument being personally executed
was "to satisfy bank auditors and the loan committee rather than create personal
liability". (Union at 666). As such, the issue in Union Bank was whether or not the
Swensons were to be held personally liable on the default of the promissory note.
The facts of this case can be distinguished from the facts of Union Bank. In
Union Bank, the issue was whether or not the Swensons intended to be personally liable
under the note which was an issue of fact. In this case, there is no issue whether
Defendant signed the note, whether Defendant intended to be personally bound by the
note, or whether there were any representations by Plaintiff to the effect that Plaintiff
would not institute collection of the note against the Defendant if there was a default
of the note. In this case, Defendant signed the note intending to be personally bound
by it. (See Exhibit "A"). There were no issues of fact, and as such, the summary
judgment entered against Defendant by the Trial Court was proper.
B. Defendant claims that the Trial Court gave "no consideration" to the
issue of fraud in Defendant's Affidavit and his Amended Answer filed with the Trial
Court. (See Defendant's Brief, page 5).
The Defendant raised the issue offraudthroughout the proceedings in the Trial
Court. Defendant asserted a counterclaim against Plaintiff based upon fraud. (See
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Trial Court Record, pages 16-18). With regard to Defendant's Counterclaim, the Trial
Court held:
The Defendant's Counterclaim is barred by the statute of
limitations and should be dismissed.
Plaintiff plead fraud as an affirmative defense in his amended answer. (See Defendant's
Answer and Counterclaim (Third Defense, Trial Record pages 14 and 15).
The Defendant orally argued the issue of fraud as a counterclaim and an
affirmative defense at the time Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard by
the Trial Court. (See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
filed by Defendant, Trial Record pages 129-133). The issue of fraud was raised and
determined by the Trial Court to be without merit under the circumstances.
Defendant's allegation that the Court gave no consideration to Defendant's fraud claim
is without merit.
POINT HI
THE DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED OR IS
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING FRAUD AS
AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.
Assuming, for argument purposes only, that there were representations made by
the Plaintiff regarding a diesel truck, it is well established that an agreement obtained
by misrepresentation,fraud,or mistake is generally voidable. Tanner v. District Judges
of the Third Judicial District Court. 649 P.2d 5, 6 (Utah 1982); Sugarhouse Finance Co.
v. Anderson. 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980); 17 AmJur.2d, Contracts §143, et seq.
(1964).
6

Where a party has entered into a contract where fraud may have been involved
and after having knowledge of the fact that fraud may have been involved, the party
continues to perform or otherwise ratifies the contract, that party is deemed to have
waived the claim of fraud- Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898, 901
(Utah 1976). It has also been held that the person who claims to be defrauded must
exercise reasonable prudence and diligence in discovering the fraud and seek a remedy
therefor or is precluded from doing so. Bezner at 901.
In the present case, the subject promissory note was executed on or about
December 20, 1986. (See Determination of Fact and Basis for Granting Summary
Judgment entered by the Trial Court, paragraph 1, a copy of which is attached hereto
as Exhibit lfC,f). The Defendant made periodic payments to the Plaintiff pursuant to the
aforesaid promissory note between January 1, 1987 and July 5, 1989, a period of
approximately two and one-half (2-1/2 years). (See Determination of Fact and Basis for
Granting Summary Judgment, Exhibit B, para. 2 and 5; page 3 of Defendant's Brief).
A person, with full knowledge of the facts, and at a time when he is fully
competent and capable to contract for himself accept the benefit accruing under a void
contract, adopts a contract, then that person is estopped to deny the validity of the
contract. Burke Aviation Corp. v. Alton Jennings Co., 377 P.2d 578 (Okl. 1963).
In the present case, the Defendant had knowledge of the facts which he now
claims, constitute a material misrepresentation "shortly after taking possession of the
truck". (See Defendant's Brief, Statement of Relevant Facts, paragraph 6, page 4).

7

Notwithstanding Defendant's knowledge of an alleged fraud, Defendant took no action
concerning the alleged fraud until he filed his Answer and Counterclaim in October
1991. (Amended Answer and Counterclaim, Trial Record pages 13-18). Defendant
waited approximately five (5) years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud
before it took any action or sought a remedy based upon the alleged fraud. Yet during
this time, he used the truck and ultimately sold the subject truck. (See Defendant's
Brief, page 4, para. 8). The Defendant waived his right to assert fraud as an affirmative
defense and/or is estopped from denying the enforceability of the note based upon fraud
as a matter of law.
Finally, it is pertinent to note, that Defendant alleges at paragraph 10 of his
Affidavit filed in opposition to the Summary Judgment (Exhibit "Cf to Defendant's brief)
that he sold the truck and paid:
[t]he entire sales price of $3,500.00 to Mr. Hanson. It was
my belief that I had paid more than the vehicle was worth
and that I had satisfied my obligation to Mr. Hansen.
In the Statement of Relevant Facts of Defendant's brief, he states at paragraph
8, page 4:
Parker eventually sold the truck for $3,500.00 and paid that
amount over to Hansen. (Affidavit of Parker 11 11).
There is, however, no proof that the Defendant communicated his ffbelief' in any way
Plaintiff.
The record of payment of the Defendant to Plaintiff as set forth in paragraph 5
of Defendant's Statement of Relevant Facts (Defendant's Brief, pages 3-4) demonstrates
8

that the Defendant did not pay the amount of $3,500.00 to Plaintiff when he sold the
truck. Defendant's last three payments to Plaintiff were:
November 19, 1988
March 14, 1989

$1,500.00
$1,500.00

July 15, 1989

$1,000.00

The Defendant's own Statement of Relevant Facts demonstrates that Defendant did not
pay $3,500.00 to Plaintiff. The appealfiledby the Plaintiff is merely a device by which
Defendant is attempting to avoid his obligations under the promissory note.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant executed and delivered to Plaintiff a promissory note on or about
December 20,1986. According to the terms of the promissory note, Defendant was to
make certain payments to the Plaintiff. At the time Defendant executed the note,
Defendant was over the age of majority and under no legal disability. The subject
promissory note was clear and unambiguous on its face and did not refer to any
collateral or security or the happening of any future event. The Defendant failed to pay
the note according to its terms. Accordingly, it was appropriate for the Trial Court to
enter summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and said summary judgment should be
affirmed by this Court.
Defendant claims that by simply raising the issue of fraud in its Counterclaim that
summary judgment should be precluded. For the reasons stated above, the case
authority upon which the Defendant relies is without merit in this case and the judgment
by the Trial Court should be affirmed.
9

Finally, if a contract is procured by fraud it may be voidable. It is, however, up
to the party who claims to be defrauded to exercise reasonable prudence and diligence
in discovering the fraud and then seek a remedy therefore or that party is precluded
from doing so as a matter of Utah law. In the present case, the Defendant, by its own
admission, discovered the facts upon which it bases its allegations of fraud in January
1987. Defendant, however, failed to take any action to enforce its rights or remedies
regarding the contract until Plaintiff brought an action to enforce the terms of the
promissory note in 1991. Defendant waived the right and/or is estopped from now
asserting the affirmative defense offraudas a matter of law and the judgment of the
Trial Court should be affirmed.
DATED this

££^*~

day of August, 1993.

s~r

ROBERT W.HDOHES
^ \
Attorney for Plan/tiffTRespondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs Brief to
Frederick N. Green and Julie V. Lund, GREEN & BERRY, 10 Exchange Place, 622
Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, this Z-& ~~ day of
August, 1993.
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FOR VALUE RECEIVED I PROMISE TO PAY TO THE ORDER.OF

with sin-per cent interest.
The entire unpaid balance of the above named principal sum and interest to become due and payable immediately
without notice or demand, in event of my failure to make any payments as above agreed.
And it is also agreed that in case of default of payment, and this note is placed in the hands of a collector or an attorney
for collection, all collection fees, attorney fees, costs, and all other expenses, will be paid by the undersigned. All parties
hereon, whether maker or endorser, each for himself, waives notice of dishonor, demand, and protest, and consents to any
extension of time the holder may rrant. All exemptions are w aived.
Address.

EXHIBIT "B"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DETERMINATIONS OF FACT AND
BASIS FOR GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

N. H. HANSEN,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

vs.

91090§lfftD!STRISTCOUaT
Tnird Judicial District

WAYNE PARKER,

FEB 9 2

m

Defendant.

/5/

SALT LAKE COUNTY

This action came on for hearing pursuant to plaintiff's
Motion

for Summary Judgment before the Court, the Honorable

Timothy R. Hanson presiding.

The plaintiff was represented by

his counsel of record, Robert W. Hughes, and the defendant was
represented by his attorney, Julie Lund, of the law firm of
Green & Berry.

The parties having made argument to the Court,

and the Court having reviewed the pleadings and the file of
this matter and being fully advised of the issues before the
Court, enters it Determinations of Fact and Basis for Granting
Summary Judgment.

FACTS
1.

On or about the 20th day of December, 1986, defendant

executed and delivered to the plaintiff a Promissory Note (the

PAGE TWO

HANSEN V. PARKER

DETERMINATIONS OF FACT

"Note"), which provided that the defendant, for value received,
promised to pay to the plaintiff, the amount of $12,700.00.
The

Note

provided

$1,000.00

per

that

month,

it

would

beginning

be

paid

January

at

1,

the

rate

1987, until

of
the

principal and accrued interest were paid in full.
2.

The

defendant

made

payments

to

the

plaintiff

as

follows:
January 1, 1987
March 10, 1987
April 13, 1987
May 1, 1987
July 21, 1987
May 1, 1988
November 18, 1988
March 14, 1989
July 15, 1989
3.

$1,000.00
1,000.00
252.00
1,000.00
240.00
1,000.00
1,500.00
1,500.00
1,000.00

There remains a balance owing by the defendant to the

plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the Note of $8,844.88 as of
August 21, 992, plus interest after that date.
4.
of

a

The Note provided that if it was placed in the hands
collector

or

an

attorney

for

collection,

then

all

collection fees, attorney's fees, costs, and all other expenses
would be paid by the defendant.
5.

The Note was placed with an attorney for collection.

HANSEN V. PARKER

6.
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DETERMINATIONS OF FACT

The defendant's Counterclaim against the plaintiff is

barred by th* statute of limitations and defendant's counsel
stipulated to the dismissal of defendant's Counterclaim at the
hearing on this matter.

GROUNDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
7.

At

the

time

the

defendant

executed

the Note, the

defendant was over the age of majority and under no legal
disability.
8.

The Note was clear and unambiguous on its face, did

not refer to any collateral or security, or the happening of
any future
9.

event.

The defendant failed to pay the Note according to its

terms.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

a

Summary

Judgment

as

a

matter of law against defendant.
2.

A Judgment in this matter in favor of the plaintiff

and against the defendant should be entered consistent with the
foregoing Determinations of Fact.
3.

The defendant's Counterclaim is barred by the statute

of limitations and should be dismissed.

HANSEN V. PARKER

4.
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DETERMINATIONS OF FACT

Plaintiff is entitled to his attorney's fees and costs

in this matter.
Dated this ^ ^ ^ d a y of February, 1993.

/2L
TIMOTHY

R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

HANSEN V. PARKER
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DETERMINATIONS OF FACT

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of

the

foregoing

Determinations

Granting Summary Judgment,

Fact

and

Basis

for

to the following, this f _ _ d a y

of February, 1993:

Robert W. Hughes
Attorney for Plaintiff
7050 S. Union Park Avenue, Suite 420
P.O. Box 57005
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-005
Frederick N. Green
Attorney for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Suite 528
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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